Irani Sangham

The strategy I’d approach

Your first research project
already has a prime suspect.

The role asks for research into post-booking customer support in Flights, with the goal of reducing contact rates. Baymard scores Booking.com’s Accounts & Self-Service at −39.9 in the app. People contact support because the surface built to prevent that contact does not work. Here is the evidence, and how I would test it properly.

Root cause 01  Self-service fails, so people call 02  A three-way handoff nobody owns 03  The decision page collapses on mobile 04  Persuasion that regulators have now priced
4.8App Store
1.5Trustpilot
−39.9App self-service
649guidelines
63topics

Four root causes, ranked

Everything I could find in the public record about Booking.com’s product experience reduces to four causes. The first one is, I think, the answer to the question this role is being hired to ask.

If you read one thing, read the orange boxes. That is the failure as a traveller actually meets it.

Ordered by relevance to the Flights post-booking brief

  1. 01

    Self-service does not work, so people contact support

    What happens

    Accounts & Self-Service is where a traveller changes a date, cancels, or chases a refund without speaking to anyone. Baymard scores it 54.0 on desktop, 13.7 on mobile web and −39.9 in the app. That last number is below the bottom of the scale, and it is the lowest score anywhere in the 649-guideline review.

    What the user actually experiences

    Your flight time moves. You open the app to change the booking, because that is where you booked it. There is no path that works, so you start a chat. The chat is a bot. You are now a contact in the contact-rate metric, and you did not want to be one either.

    EVIDENCE   App self-service −39.9  ·  mobile web 13.7  ·  desktop 54.0  ·  refunds and modifications are the top two themes in Flights reviews FIX → Treat self-service as the contact-deflection product it already is, and instrument it against contact rate rather than task completion.
  2. 02

    A three-way handoff that nobody owns

    What happens

    A flight bought on Booking.com may be ticketed by a partner agent and operated by a carrier. Three parties, one traveller, and no declared owner of the case. Reviewers describe being passed between all three, with escalation requests refused and refunds running past ten weeks.

    What the user actually experiences

    “They constantly tried to send me to the airline, and both companies won’t contact the other.” Nobody says no. Nobody says yes. You are the only party with an interest in the case, and you have the least power in it.

    EVIDENCE   Booking.com Flights 1.5 / 5 across 371 reviews  ·  refunds reported at 10+ weeks  ·  “flexible” changes incurring fees that negate the flexibility bought FIX → One case, one owner, one thread, with ownership assigned by the platform rather than discovered by the traveller.
  3. 03

    The decision page collapses on the devices people decide on

    What happens

    Property & Room Detail Pages score 43.4 on desktop, 15.6 on mobile web and 10.5 in the app, across 151 guidelines. It is the page where the choice is actually made, and it is weakest on the two surfaces where most people make it.

    What the user actually experiences

    The page you use to decide is the page that tells you least, on the phone you are booking from. So you decide on less, and find out the rest after you have paid.

    EVIDENCE   Detail pages 43.4 desktop / 15.6 mobile web / 10.5 app  ·  151 guidelines  ·  “misrepresented listings” a recurring Trustpilot theme FIX → Rebuild the detail page mobile-first against the guideline set. Under-informed decisions are a leading indicator of post-booking contacts.
  4. 04

    Persuasion that regulators have now put a price on

    What happens

    Urgency messaging, drip pricing and account-gated rates have moved from growth tactic to legal exposure. Spain’s CNMC fined Booking.com €413 million in 2024; Hungary fined it around €7 million in 2020 over countdowns and “last room” messages; a Dutch class action followed in 2025.

    What the user actually experiences

    “Only 1 room left” made you hurry. Seventy-five euros of fees on a two-hundred-and-eleven-euro base made you feel tricked. Both are design decisions, and the second one is what people write the review about.

    EVIDENCE   CNMC €413m (2024)  ·  Hungary ~€7m (2020)  ·  Dutch class action (2025)  ·  documented €75 of fees on a €211 base FIX → Research the honest version and measure it properly. If transparent pricing converts within tolerance, the argument is won with data rather than ethics.

Protect these, and keep strengthening them

Four things are genuinely strong and should be built around, not traded against: homepage, navigation and taxonomy (84.4 desktop and 89.4 mobile web, among the best scores in the review), app site-wide design and interaction at 89.8, the app itself (4.8 across 2.1 million App Store ratings), and the sheer breadth of inventory that makes the Connected Trip plausible in the first place. Booking.com is excellent at getting people to a decision. The gap is everything after it.

01

User issues

What the public record says about the Booking.com product experience, with Flights separated out where the evidence allows, and what each finding translates into as an issue, a perception and a fix.

Three scoreboards, three different answers

The spread here is the widest I have seen on any product I have looked at, and the gap itself is the diagnostic: each measure captures a different moment in the relationship.

4.8App Store: the app, rated while the trip is still ahead2.1 million ratings
1.5Trustpilot: written after something went wrong125,582 reviews · 73% one-star
1.5Trustpilot, Flights specifically: the same verdict, narrower sample371 reviews
649Baymard guidelines assessed across 63 topics and three surfacesQ4 2023 review · 184 sites benchmarked

A 3.3-star gap between the app store and Trustpilot is not noise. It is a product that is excellent right up until the moment something changes, and then has almost nothing to offer. That transition point is exactly what this role has been asked to research.

The complaints

Eighteen, bucketed by severity and collapsed by default. Open a bucket, or filter to one.

Critical 7Drives contacts, refunds and regulatory exposure
App self-service scores below zeroInterface

−39.9 across 13 guidelines. The surface that exists to let people manage a booking without contacting anyone is the worst-performing thing in the review.

Refunds running past ten weeksFlights

Reviewers describe waits of ten weeks and longer, some over a year, with the platform deferring to the airline and the airline deferring back.

Nobody owns the case in a three-party bookingFlights

Booking.com, the ticketing agent and the carrier each route the traveller to the next. Requests to escalate to a manager are reported as refused.

Support is chatbot-first and hard to escalatePlatform

The single most common theme across 125,582 reviews: waits of forty minutes and more, agents who do not follow up, and AI systems in place of a human.

“Flexible” changes that are not flexibleFlights

Travellers who paid for flexibility report change fees that cancel out the value of the option they bought. A product-definition problem before it is a service one.

Drip pricing and undisclosed feesPlatform

Documented in one case as €75 of fees added to a €211 base. Now a regulated matter rather than a conversion tactic.

Fabricated urgencyPlatform

“Only 1 room left” and countdown messaging drew a fine in Hungary in 2020 and formed part of the CNMC case in Spain in 2024.

Serious 6Erodes trust and generates avoidable contacts
Property and room detail pages at 15.6 and 10.5Interface

Across 151 guidelines on the two mobile surfaces. The decision page, weakest where the decision is made.

Listings that do not match what arrivesPlatform

Rooms without windows, missing amenities, conditions well below what was advertised. Every mismatch becomes a support contact.

Cancellation ownership disputesFlights

When a carrier cancels, reviewers report Booking.com declining responsibility and redirecting them to the carrier, who redirects them back.

Travel search scores around 40 on every surfaceInterface

40.4 desktop, 40.0 mobile web, 39.7 app, across 136 guidelines. Consistently middling on the highest-traffic task in the product.

Site-wide design and navigation at 38.1 on desktopInterface

Against 89.8 in the app. The app has solved something the desktop site has not, inside the same company.

Loyalty and rewards not creditedPlatform

App reviewers report completed stays with no Genius credit appearing, and no practical route to query it that is cheaper than calling.

Neutral 5Real, lower impact: watch rather than act
Price perceptionPlatform

App reviewers describe rates well above what they remember paying. A market condition as much as a product one, but it shapes how every other failure is read.

Account-gated pricingPlatform

Rates visible only after sign-in. Defensible as a loyalty mechanic, cited by regulators as a transparency problem.

Mobile checkout at 55.3, app at 56.9Interface

The best-scoring transactional area in the review, and still only just over half. Solid rather than good.

Desktop accounts at 54.0Interface

The self-service problem is not universal. Desktop is passable, which makes the app score harder to explain and more worth researching.

Review responsivenessPlatform

Trustpilot notes that negative reviews go unanswered. A missed listening channel more than a service failure.

What it translates to

Seven themes. The perception column is what produces a 73% one-star distribution, and the fix column is where research earns its place.

Theme → issue → perception → fix
ThemeThe issueThe perception it createsWhat to fix
Self-service voidApp accounts at −39.9, mobile web at 13.7“There is no way to fix this myself”Rebuild self-service around the top contact drivers, measured on contacts avoided
Ownership vacuumThree parties, no declared case owner“Everyone is responsible so no one is”Platform-assigned ownership, visible to the traveller from the first message
Decision starvationDetail pages at 15.6 and 10.5 on mobile“It wasn’t what the page said it was”Mobile-first detail pages; under-informed decisions become later contacts
Flexibility mismatchPaid flexibility undermined by change fees“I paid extra for nothing”Define the promise, then price it, then say so plainly
Fee surpriseDrip pricing, account-gated rates“They hid the real price until the end”All-in price early; test the conversion cost properly rather than assuming it
Manufactured urgencyScarcity and countdown messaging“I was rushed into it”Replace with true scarcity signals; measure regret and refund rate, not just conversion
Support as a wallChatbot first, escalation refused, no follow-up“There is nobody in there”One case, one owner, one thread, with a stated escalation path

How that compares

The honest finding first: the entire online travel agency category is rated appallingly, and Booking.com is the least bad of the majors. Bad post-booking service is a category norm rather than a Booking.com signature, which means it is available as a differentiator to whoever fixes it first.

Trustpilot rating, online travel compared

Booking.com
1.5 · 125,582
Booking Flights
1.5 · 371
Airbnb
1.3 · 18,000
Expedia
1.2 · 12,387
0rating out of 5 · review count shown5.0
Read this as grievance volume rather than quality. The distributions are what matter: Booking.com is 73% one-star, Airbnb 85%, Expedia 93%. Booking.com leads its category and the category is on the floor, which is a strategic opening rather than a comfort.
Signature complaints and structural position
PlatformRatingSignature complaintsRelevant to Flights
Booking.com1.5 / 5Support unreachable; refunds delayed; listings misrepresented; drip pricing; urgency messaging—
Airbnb1.3 / 5Host cancellations; refunds delayed; disputes decided against the reviewer; account suspensionsSame failure shape: a marketplace that will not arbitrate between two parties it introduced.
Expedia1.2 / 5Booking errors; hold times; refunds taking weeks; hidden chargesThe direct OTA comparator, and the only one that answers a third of its negative reviews.
Airlines directvariesOwn set of failures, but one accountable partyThe real alternative for a frustrated flyer: booking direct removes the handoff entirely. That is what Flights is competing against.

The read: Flights is not really competing with Expedia on price. It is competing with booking direct on certainty, and every unresolved handoff hands a customer back to the airline’s own website next time.

02

Design strategies

The same evidence read through four strategic lenses, because “reduce contact rate” is a target, not a strategy, and the difference between the two is exactly where a researcher earns their keep.

Business model innovation

Booking.com monetises the moment of commitment and, for most of its history, has not had to own what happens afterwards. Flights strains that model harder than accommodation does, because a flight changes far more often than a hotel room, and the change is where the whole cost sits.

Value creation

Choice and comparison at a scale no single supplier can offer, plus the Connected Trip thesis: one place for the flight, the room, the car and the rest. Flights is the pillar that makes that thesis credible.

Value capture

Commission at the point of booking, plus ancillaries and loyalty. Revenue lands at commitment; cost lands at change. The incentive gradient runs the wrong way for post-booking service.

The structural flaw

The party that earns the trust is Booking.com; the party that spends it is often a ticketing agent or a carrier. In accommodation that seam is narrow. In Flights it is the whole product, which is why root cause 02 is a Flights problem before it is a platform one.

The model-level move

Treat post-booking as part of the product rather than as the cost of it. A traveller who can change a flight themselves in ninety seconds does not contact anyone, does not write a one-star review, and books the next flight in the same place. Contact rate is not only a cost line, it is the best available proxy for whether the Connected Trip promise survives contact with reality.

The ten types of innovation

Doblin’s framework argues that winning innovations combine three to five reinforcing types, and that most organisations over-invest in product performance alone. Mapped to Booking.com Flights, the neglected types cluster tightly.

Ten types · where Booking.com stands
ClusterTypeBooking.com todayOpportunity
ConfigurationNetworkStrong: carriers, agents, properties, at global scaleMake the network legible to the traveller instead of invisible
ConfigurationProcessHandoffs with no declared ownerAssign case ownership by design, not by escalation
ConfigurationProfit modelCommission at commitmentPrice flexibility as a real product with a real promise behind it
OfferingProduct performanceUneven: navigation 89, self-service −39.9Level the floor before raising the ceiling
OfferingProduct systemConnected Trip in progressThe connection is only real if a change to one leg is handled across all of them
ExperienceServiceWeakest area: the most common complaint in 125,582 reviewsThe single biggest unclaimed differentiator in online travel
ExperienceChannelApp excellent for booking, worst for managingThe same app has to hold both halves of the trip
ExperienceBrandTrusted to find, distrusted to fixCertainty as the position, evidenced rather than asserted
ExperienceCustomer engagementPersuasion under regulatory challengeRebuild the persuasion layer on true signals and prove the cost is survivable
ConfigurationStructureNot externally visibleOut of scope for public research
Strength: protect it Neutral or unknown Underperforming Failing: act here

The read: every Experience type is underperforming or failing, and that cluster is where every complaint in path 01 lives. A combination play across Service + Process + Brand is three reinforcing types, which is exactly what the framework says wins, and it is reachable from a single research programme.

Integrative thinking

Roger Martin describes this as facing the tension between opposing ideas constructively and, rather than choosing one, producing a resolution that contains both and is superior to either. Research lives on that skill: the job is usually to refuse the trade-off the room has already accepted. Three worth resolving here.

Tension 01

Conversion vs. trust

Model A: urgency and drip pricing demonstrably convert. Model B: they now carry nine-figure regulatory cost and a 73% one-star distribution.

Resolution: stop treating it as a values argument and make it an evidence one. Run the honest version as a proper experiment and measure it on lifetime value, refund rate and contact rate, not on session conversion. If the honest version holds, the debate is over.

Tension 02

Contact rate vs. contactability

Model A: fewer contacts is the goal, so make contacting harder. Model B: people contact because something is genuinely wrong, and blocking them turns a problem into a review.

Resolution: separate the metric into avoidable and unavoidable contacts. Drive the first to zero by fixing self-service; make the second faster and easier to reach. One number hides two opposite problems.

Tension 03

Research depth vs. delivery speed

Model A: product teams move weekly and cannot wait for a study. Model B: fast research produces confident answers to the wrong question.

Resolution: hold a standing evidence base so most questions are already answered, and reserve new fieldwork for what is genuinely unknown. Speed comes from having looked before you were asked, not from cutting the study short.

Design thinking, and where the squiggle actually goes

The squiggle running through this page is the argument: uncertainty is front-loaded, and clarity is earned by narrowing. The temptation here is to skip the divergent half, because the contact-rate target is already set and Baymard already names the weak surfaces. For two of the four causes that is correct. For the other two it would answer the wrong question quickly.

Where to converge immediately

Self-service and the detail page. These are solved problems with 649 documented guidelines pointing at the answers, and the scores are unambiguous. No ideation required: this is execution against a known standard, and treating it as an exploration would waste a quarter.

Where to stay divergent

Why people contact, and what honest persuasion costs. Neither is answerable from a benchmark. The first needs contact-driver analysis joined to behavioural data and interviews; the second needs a properly powered experiment. These are the two places where new research changes the decision rather than confirming it.

The gaps worth attacking

Every OTA draws the same generic complaints. The strategic question is which are worse at Booking.com, or uniquely available to it. Five hold up.

  1. 01

    An 89 and a −39.9 in the same app

    Site-wide interaction scores 89.8 in the app while self-service scores −39.9. The capability is demonstrably in the building. This is about where attention has been pointed, which is a far cheaper problem to solve than a capability gap.

  2. 02

    The category’s worst-served moment is unclaimed

    Every major OTA fails at post-booking. Nobody has taken it as a position. The first one to make change and cancellation genuinely self-serve takes the airline’s strongest argument away from it.

  3. 03

    Flights changes more than hotels do

    Schedule changes, cancellations and disruptions are normal in aviation and rare in accommodation. A post-booking model designed for hotels will keep failing in Flights, and Flights is where the Connected Trip is won or lost.

  4. 04

    Regulators have priced the persuasion layer

    €413m in Spain, a Dutch class action, an EU gatekeeper designation. The commercial question is no longer whether to change it, but what the honest version costs, and that is a measurable research question.

  5. 05

    The contact-rate brief is unusually well posed

    Most research briefs arrive vague. This one names an outcome, a domain and a stage of the journey. That is rare, and it means the first study can start on week one rather than after a scoping exercise.

03

Interface

Usability and accessibility as measured rather than felt: Baymard’s 649-guideline review across three surfaces, and the usability updates it produces.

Baymard UX performance by surface

Desktop Web
46.1 · 224 guidelines
Mobile App
42.7 · 205
Mobile Web
41.5 · 220
PoorMediocreDecentGoodPerfect
Tightly clustered in the low forties across all three surfaces. As with any average, the totals hide the story: these are made of scores ranging from 89.8 down to −39.9, which is a very different problem from being uniformly mediocre.

Where the points are lost

Baymard score by area and surface · guideline count in brackets
Assessment areaDesktopMobile webAppRead
Homepage, Navigation & Taxonomy84.4 [11]89.4 [10]69.1 [10]The strongest area in the review, and unusual in the industry. Getting people to a decision is genuinely well solved.
Site-Wide Design & Interaction38.1 [13]48.7 [27]89.8 [23]A 51-point spread across surfaces for the same discipline. The app has solved something the desktop site has not.
Checkout Process47.8 [79]55.3 [71]56.9 [69]219 guidelines, the largest pool in the review, and the most consistent. Solid rather than good.
Travel Search40.4 [48]40.0 [47]39.7 [41]136 guidelines sitting at exactly middling on every surface. The highest-traffic task in the product.
Property & Room Detail Pages43.4 [52]15.6 [50]10.5 [49]The decision page, collapsing on the two surfaces where most decisions happen.
Accounts & Self-Service54.0 [21]13.7 [15]−39.9 [13]The lowest score in the review, below the bottom of the scale, on the surface most people manage bookings from. This is the contact-rate problem, measured.
Poor or below scale Mediocre Decent Good or better

Accessibility

This is the area I can speak to with the most direct experience, and it is also where I have to be most careful about what I can and cannot claim from outside.

What I could and could not check

Booking.com publishes an accessibility statement, which is good practice and more than many travel platforms manage. I could not retrieve it or run my own automated scan from this environment, so I am not going to characterise its contents or claim findings I did not verify. What follows is what the usability evidence implies, flagged as inference rather than audit.

Where the risk concentrates

The European Accessibility Act has applied since June 2025, and travel booking services sit squarely inside its scope. Under EN 301 549 the expectation is WCAG 2.2 Level AA across the booking journey, including the app. The areas scoring worst here, self-service, forms and detail pages, are the same components that carry the heaviest accessibility obligations.

What I would do in week one

Baseline properly: an automated pass across the booking and manage-booking journeys, a manual WCAG 2.2 AA audit of the highest-traffic flows, and assistive-technology testing with real users on the change-and-cancel path. Then prioritise by transaction impact rather than issue count, and land fixes in design-system components so each one ships once.

Why this belongs in a research role, not beside it

Accessibility failures and contact drivers are usually the same failures. A form field without a proper label, an error message that does not announce itself, a change flow that cannot be completed without sighted mouse use: each produces an abandoned task, and an abandoned task in post-booking becomes a support contact. Studying them together is cheaper than studying them twice, and it lets one programme of work answer to both a legal obligation and a commercial target. That is the argument I have made to product teams for three years, and it is the one I would make here.

Usability updates, in the order the data supports

  1. 01

    Rebuild app self-service around the top contact drivers

    −39.9 across 13 guidelines. Change a date, cancel, chase a refund, get a receipt, correct a name: each one completable in the app, with state visible without contacting anyone, and with accessible labelling and error handling designed in rather than retrofitted.

    Directly addresses the role’s stated first project, and closes the lowest score in the review.
  2. 02

    Give the traveller a named owner for every case

    One case, one thread, one accountable party, decided by the platform. Status visible without asking. The three-way handoff is not a service failure, it is an information-design failure with a service consequence.

    Closes root cause 02 and the loudest theme in Flights reviews.
  3. 03

    Rebuild the detail page mobile-first

    15.6 mobile web, 10.5 app, across 151 guidelines. Structured attributes, honest imagery, complete fare and fee conditions, and change and cancellation terms stated before purchase rather than discovered after it.

    Under-informed decisions are a leading indicator of post-booking contacts.
  4. 04

    Port the app’s site-wide patterns to the web

    89.8 in the app against 38.1 on desktop for the same discipline. The better implementation already exists inside the company, on a different surface.

    Highest points-per-effort in the list: the work is done, on the wrong platform.
  5. 05

    Bring travel search off the 40-point plateau

    40.4, 40.0 and 39.7 across 136 guidelines. Remarkably consistent, which suggests a shared root cause rather than three separate ones, and makes it a good candidate for a single diagnostic study.

  6. 06

    Baseline accessibility to WCAG 2.2 AA across the manage-booking journey

    Automated pass, manual audit of the highest-traffic flows, assistive-technology testing on change and cancel. Prioritised by transaction impact and fixed in components.

    Overlaps almost entirely with fixes 01 and 03, so it costs far less run together than run separately.

Two independent instruments, a 649-guideline benchmark and 125,582 public reviews, point at the same surface: the place where a traveller goes to change something. That agreement is the strongest signal in this document, and it is the surface this role has been asked to research.

04

Research

Everything above is desk research, and desk research is a hypothesis generator, not an answer. This is how I would actually run the first project: post-booking customer support in Flights, with the goal of reducing contact rates.

The framing matters more than the method. “Reduce contact rate” is a target that can be hit by making contact harder, which would raise every other number that matters. So the first job is to split the metric into contacts that should never have happened and contacts that should be easy, and then never confuse them again.

Weeks 1–4 · Frame

Find out what people are actually contacting about

Secondary and behavioural first. It is cheaper, faster, and it tells you what to ask in the field.

  • Contact-driver analysis: code support transcripts and tickets into a taxonomy of reasons, sized by volume and cost
  • Join that to behavioural data: where in the manage-booking flow the contact was preceded by an abandoned self-service attempt
  • Heuristic evaluation of the change, cancel and refund paths on all three surfaces, against the guideline set already in play
  • Literature and competitor review: what the airlines and the other OTAs do at the same moment
  • Stakeholder interviews with CS leads, Product, and the partner-facing teams, to surface constraints before proposing anything
Weeks 5–10 · Field

Go and watch it happen

Primary research, aimed at the specific drivers the framing phase ranked highest.

  • Depth interviews with travellers who contacted support in the last 30 days, sampled by driver rather than by convenience
  • Usability testing of the current change and cancel flows, including with assistive technology users
  • A survey powered to size the drivers across markets, so the qualitative story carries a number with it
  • Diary study across a disrupted trip, because the moment of change is not reproducible in a lab
Ongoing · Land

Make it change something

A finding that does not alter a decision was not worth gathering. Landing is part of the method, not the afterthought.

  • Findings paired with design directions, so the recommendation is actionable in a backlog rather than admirable in a deck
  • A pre-registered success measure agreed before the work ships: avoidable contacts, not total contacts
  • A standing evidence base so the next question is half-answered before it is asked
  • Follow-up sessions with the teams implementing it, because the report is not the deliverable, the change is

The method mix, and why each one is there

No single method answers this question. The contact-rate brief needs volume and reason, behaviour and motivation, and the honest answer sits in the overlap. Each method below covers a specific weakness in the others.

Behavioural analysis

Contact and journey data joined together. Tells you how often and where, at full scale.

Blind to why. Will happily explain a behaviour that never happened.
Depth interviews

Travellers who contacted support recently, sampled by driver. Tells you what they were trying to do and what they believed.

Small n, and memory is reconstructive. Needs the numbers beside it.
Usability testing

The change and cancel flows, observed. Tells you exactly where the task breaks, including with assistive technology.

Artificial stakes. Nobody in a lab has actually missed a flight.
Survey

Powered to size the drivers across markets, so the qualitative story arrives with a number attached.

Only as good as the framing that preceded it. Never run first.
Secondary & expert review

Heuristic evaluation, literature, competitor and desk research. Cheapest evidence available, and the fastest route to a good question.

Generates hypotheses, not answers. Mistaking one for the other is how this page could mislead you.

Contact drivers: the hypotheses I would test first

Seven hypotheses, drawn from the public evidence above, each with the signal that would confirm it, the method that would test it, and what would have to move for the fix to count. This is the table I would want to be wrong about in week four.

Hypothesis → signal → method → measure
Hypothesised driverWhat you would seeHow I would test itWhat has to move
Self-service dead endContacts preceded by an abandoned manage-booking session within the hour.Behavioural join, then usability testing of that exact path.Avoidable contacts per thousand bookings.
Ownership confusionContacts that open with “who do I even talk to”, or arrive after contact with another party.Transcript coding plus depth interviews with three-party bookings.Repeat contacts on the same case.
Expectation gap on flexibilityContacts from travellers who bought a flexible fare and were charged to use it.Transcript coding, then a comprehension test of the fare terms as displayed.Contacts citing flexibility, and refund requests on those fares.
Under-informed bookingContacts about conditions that were technically disclosed but not seen.Detail-page usability testing with eye on what was actually read.Post-booking contacts in the first 48 hours.
Status anxietyContacts that ask for information rather than action: is it confirmed, has it been refunded.Diary study across a disrupted trip; sizing survey.Information-only contacts, which should be the easiest to remove.
Accessibility exclusionTasks that cannot be completed with assistive technology, appearing as contacts rather than as errors.Assistive-technology testing on change and cancel, plus a WCAG 2.2 AA audit.Task completion parity between assistive and non-assistive users.
Escalation blockingContacts repeated because the first attempt could not reach anyone able to decide.Transcript analysis of repeat contacts; interviews with CS agents.First-contact resolution, and the ratio of unavoidable contacts resolved once.

Four ongoing research practices

A single project answers one question. These are the loops that make the second question cheaper than the first, which is how a research function of three people covers a domain this size.

Practice 01

The standing evidence base

ContinuousSearchableTeam-owned

Every study, finding and contradiction filed against the journey stage it belongs to, so the next question starts half-answered. The fastest research is the research you already did and can find.

RETURNS → Turnaround on a new question drops, without anyone cutting a study short.

Practice 02

Contact-driver tracking

MonthlyQuantitativeShared with CS

The driver taxonomy maintained as a live measure rather than a one-off analysis, split into avoidable and unavoidable from the start. It becomes the shared language between Research, Product and Customer Service.

RETURNS → The team can see whether a shipped fix actually removed the contact it targeted.

Practice 03

Continuous contact with travellers

FortnightlyOpen to the teamRotating

A standing slot of sessions with real travellers that anyone in the multidisciplinary team can attend. Watching one person fail a task changes more minds than any deck, and it distributes user advocacy instead of centralising it in me.

RETURNS → Product, UX and Engineering start arguing from evidence rather than from preference.

Practice 04

Method development

QuarterlyTimeboxedWritten up

The role asks for testing new ways of gathering insight. I would treat that as a real practice: one new tool or mixed method per quarter, run on a live question, with an honest written verdict on whether it earned its place. Including where AI-assisted analysis holds up and where it quietly invents a pattern.

RETURNS → The craft improves on evidence rather than on enthusiasm.

How I would know it is working

Five measures. The first one is the one I would insist on, because it is the difference between reducing contacts and hiding them.

  1. 01

    Avoidable contacts, not total contacts

    The metric split into contacts that should never have happened and contacts that should be easy. Driving the first to zero while making the second faster. One number hides two opposite problems, and optimising the wrong one makes the product worse.

  2. 02

    Self-service task completion, including with assistive technology

    Measured on the real change-and-cancel paths, with parity between assistive and non-assistive users treated as the pass mark rather than a stretch goal.

  3. 03

    Decisions changed

    How often a finding altered what a team built, versus how often it confirmed what they had already decided. The only honest measure of whether research is influencing or decorating.

  4. 04

    Time to a defensible answer

    Falling, as the evidence base fills. Rising turnaround usually means the team is re-running work it already has.

  5. 05

    Who else talks to travellers

    Whether Product, UX and Engineering are attending sessions and citing users unprompted. If user advocacy lives only with the researcher, the researcher has become a bottleneck rather than a multiplier.

The thing I actually care about

I have spent six years turning research into things teams can act on the same week, in two-hour sessions with product owners, developers and business analysts who did not commission the work and did not have to agree with it. What I care about is not the study, it is the moment someone changes their mind because they finally saw what a person was actually trying to do. Everything above is a structured way of getting more of those moments, more often, with better evidence behind them.

Method, and what to distrust

Sources used

  • Review corpora: Trustpilot (Booking.com, Booking.com Flights, Airbnb, Expedia), Apple App Store.
  • Regulatory record: Spain’s CNMC decision, the Hungarian competition authority, the Dutch class action, and reporting on EU dark-pattern enforcement.
  • Heuristic audit: the Baymard review of Booking.com, Q4 2023, 649 guidelines across 63 topics and three surfaces, benchmarked against 184 major ecommerce sites.
  • Role context: the published Booking.com vacancy for Researcher II, Flights.
  • Frameworks: Doblin’s Ten Types of Innovation (Keeley), Roger Martin’s integrative thinking.

Known biases and limits

  • Trustpilot self-selects for grievance. A 1.5 is not a satisfaction score; it measures how bad the worst experiences are and how motivated people are to record them.
  • App stores self-select for satisfaction, and are usually rated before the trip, not after a problem.
  • The Flights sample is small. 371 reviews is enough to show a pattern and not enough to size one. I have treated it as directional throughout.
  • The Baymard review is Q4 2023. Some of it will have moved. Where I quote a score I am quoting that review, not today’s product.
  • I could not verify accessibility directly. No scan, no access to the statement from this environment. The accessibility section is explicitly inference and a proposed method, not findings.
  • This is outside-in research. No internal data, no contact-driver taxonomy, no roadmap, no constraints. Everything here is a hypothesis that a fortnight inside the team would sharpen or kill, and path 04 is written on that assumption.

Sources

  1. Trustpilot: Booking.com
  2. Trustpilot: Booking.com Flights
  3. App Store: Booking.com
  4. Trustpilot: Airbnb
  5. Trustpilot: Expedia
  6. Baymard Institute: UX benchmark
  7. Dark patterns on Booking.com: manipulation tactics and legal consequences
  8. Cybernews: Booking.com sued over dark patterns
  9. CNN: campaigners on Booking.com’s sales tactics
  10. Hospitality Today: Europe vs Booking.com
  11. Booking.com: accessibility statement (not retrievable from this environment)
  12. Doblin: Ten Types of Innovation
  13. Roger Martin: The Opposable Mind (integrative thinking)
Ratings and review counts captured 31 August 2026 and will drift.
Baymard scores are from the Q4 2023 review and may not reflect the product today.
The squiggle is a simplified nod to Damien Newman’s design process diagram, not a reproduction of it.